Evening thought
Assume it is the case that there is no privileged ontological way to “carve the world at its joints” and so some form of mereological ontological nihilism is correct.
Also assume that the sense of oneness that meditating persons receive can be explained in terms of neurobiology.
Is there any connection, logical or causal between the two assumptions? Or is it merely happenstance that a truth about reality and a brain-based experience have some kind of correlation? (Correlation may be too strong; interpretive similitude might be a better term?)
July 24th, 2008 at 1:15 pm
I think you meant “ontological nihilism” right? You aren’t so much concerned with the possibility that nothing has parts, but with the possibility that any ontology at all, even one of mereological simples, is not privileged above any other ontology. Is that right? Its hard to see what the connection between such nihilism and the meditative state might be given your hypothesis that the meditative state can be explained neurobiologically. After all, the temptation is to attribute the “oneness” experienced in meditation to revelation or insight into the nature of reality, but if its really just feedback from the neural system, then the inference from the meditative state to metaphysical conclusions is dubious.
July 24th, 2008 at 1:45 pm
Fixed. Um, that’s what I get for writing a post after I’ve had a few mojitos! Yeah, that’s precisely the worry I was having–I was reading about the Potthapada Sutta and the various jhanas last night. (While drinking mojitos–I haven’t taken any vows, so I can handle the contradiction!) Anyway, I can see the inferences made from neurobiology to claims about the existence of the self, but moving from there to the oneness of everything seems impossible.
August 3rd, 2008 at 9:56 pm
Isn’t “ontological relativity” the applicable term here, as opposed to “ontological nihilism?” I mean, it seems like ontological nihilism would be the doctrine that nothing exists, which hardly seems like a legitimate conclusion from the much weaker position that there is no single correct account of reality/that which exists.