Arbitrary Marks

How do you distinguish the gender of these two individuals on the cover of April’s J Crew catalog? What visual cues differentiate “masculine” and “feminine”, despite the similar dress style (tie, khakis, blue shirt, etc)?

In 1978, Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna wrote a book, Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach that attempted to answer this question. Given some of the discussion here about the pregnant transman, I thought a summary/analysis of an excerpt would be in order.*

And, just to clarify, my academic background is not in women’s or gender studies. I’m curious about questions about concepts and experience primarily from the angle of analytic philosophy, motivated by personal interests and topics pertinent to the culture in which I live.

The Ten Question Gender Game

The authors played a “game” with over 40 people, in which subjects could ask “yes” or “no” question to ascertain the gender of a person. The only off-limits question was “Is the person male or female?” Kessler and McKenna found that once individuals had made a tentative assertion about someone’s gender, they tended to interpret other information through that. Further, subjects were hesitant to ask questions about genitals–they assumed that was to ask the question “Is the person male or female?”

Genitals and Gender

Kessler and McKenna investigated as well, the circumstances in which genders were assigned to figures with mixed gender characteristics: perhaps a flat chest, body hair and a vagina; or breasts, long hair and a penis. Then they asked, what would you do to change the figure into the other gender?

With 32 figures whose genitals were covered, they gave ten primarily “female” characteristics, ten primarily “male” characteristics and twelve had equal “female” and “male.” Thus you should have 50 percent attribution of “male” and 50 percent attribution of “female.” Instead, they found that 69 percent of the figures were marked as “male.”

Their theory is that (along with other studies they cite), we have evidence that people are predisposed to interpret neutral cues to be male. Further, even female cues like vaginas (in the figures without covered genitals) could be interpreted as male in figures with short hair, a flat chest and a hairy body. Having a vagina in these figures required at least three additional female cues to be interpreted strongly as “female” (95%)–and those cues needed to include long hair and either wide hips or breasts.

If, however, figures had a penis, then no number of female cues would strongly influence people to assert the identity as male. Rather, they were uncertain, and then only when there were four female cues.  The follow-up question of “How would you change this figure to be the opposite gender?” reflects this central concern: adding/removing a vagina was far less frequently noted, instead the male genitalia needed to be added/removed.

The author’s conclusion, then, is that “To be male is to ‘have’ something and to be female is to ‘not have it’”

Application to Social Gender

So what? Typically, our genitals are hidden from others, and we are interpreted as male/female based on other markers.  True, but the implication is that certain genitals accompany certain social cues. Based on the distinctions between male and female biology, we construct two genders. This dichotomous schema is applied, even when (as in the case of the mixed signals above), there are conflicting cues.

Short hair? No facial hair? How do we ascertain gender in this instance? Not all men grow beards or have long hair. The authors argue that, in Western culture, we tend to follow the rule “See someone as female only when you cannot see them as male.” In other words, “male” is a default category, which must be disproven by obvious contradictory cues.

As support, Kessler and McKenna point to the relative ease with which female-to-male transsexuals “pass” in daily life, in contrast to male-to-females. Even one “male” sign is highly powerful in determining gender, whereas once assumed “male”, cues that might otherwise be “female” can be reinterpreted.

Cart before the horse?

Here’s where the question of concepts and experience comes in. I’ll give Kessler and McKenna a pass for citing Whorf and the Eskimo hypothesis (though even by the 1970s, I think his viewpoint had been roundly criticized).  Their thesis gets more controversial: “Biological, psychological, and social differences do not lead to our seeing two genders. Our seeing of two genders leads to the ‘discovery’ of biological, psychological and social differences.”

Granting that mammalian sexual reproduction requires sperm and egg cell carriers, the authors argue that “male” and “female” are not coextensive with the two terms. Returning to the earlier question of whether Thomas Beatie is “male” or “female”, some object that because he is an egg cell carrier, he is a female. This is, to them, as analytically true as “a bachelor is an unmarried man.”

In contrast, the argument Kessler and McKenna make is that “male” and “female” are grounded in culture, not biology, and that the reproductive dichotomy is not essential. Based on the cues that Beatie presents himself with, he is interpreted as “male” (even while pregnant, apparently most read his large midsection as a man’s potbelly).  Yet, once his capability to bear children is revealed, these cues are rejected in favor of interpreting him as “female”, although I think that most people looking at Beatie “see” him as male, supporting the earlier contention of the primary of male cues.

The question really comes down, I think, to what we mean by “male” and “female.” If we’re primarily concerned with genitalia, then, yes, Beatie is female (I don’t know if he’s had a phalloplasty, but certainly he has a vagina). But if “male” and “female” refer to cultural attributions that we make, it’s far less clear cut.

Some questions

For me, at least, I have a few questions about the distinction between gender-qua-culture and gender-qua-sex. If gender is about attribution, then where does the concern with error arise? As a rule-based behavior, there’s a sense in which we can make a “mistake” in calling someone “ma’am” or “sir.” The assumption is that a masculine female is still a female and an effeminate male still a man. Even though I gave the authors a pass for citing Whorf, I will bring it up again: the theory is that our language strongly influences our perception, so much so that, just as Eskimos “see” more kinds of snow than we do, Westerners “see” certain gender cues more perceptively than another culture might. The first claim has been shown to be bogus. What of the second?

And, on the other side, if gender is culturally based, then why is there such pressure (internal and external) for transgendered persons to transition medically? Why spend thousands of dollars, endure multiple surgeries and social stigma in order to “pass”?  Why not bind your breasts, wear men’s clothing, and go about your business? There seems to be some pressure to become the opposite gender in the same way that the subjects in the studies suggest: “add a penis” or “add breasts.”  If we are only talking about attribution, then this seems like a lot of extra work. Yet transgendered persons, when they tell their stories, talk about their experience of being another gender. Is this merely self-attribution, or is something else going on?  Another way to put it–is being transgender a result of an internalized dichotomous gender schema (choose which J. Crew model you “are”), or is there some di(tri?)chotomy already present, based on biology we don’t yet understand?

* Found in Susan Stryker, Stephen Whittle, Eds. The Transgender Studies Reader. “Toward a Theory of Gender,” Suzanne J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna. New York: Routledge, 2006, (165-182).

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This entry was posted on Friday, April 11th, 2008 at 10:34 pm and is filed under Epistemology, Gender, Philosophy, Pop culture. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed. Email me at arbitrary [dot] marks [at] gmail [dot] com if you think a discussion should be re-opened.