Whatever you say (teaching philosophy and social constructivism)
Is knowledge “intrinsically the common property of a group or else nothing at all?” This quote comes from a postscript to Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and refers to “scientific” knowledge in the original. But social constructivists like Kenneth Bruffee, whose Collaborative Learning I just read, think the point applies to all knowledge. He repeats this particular quote time and again throughout the text, along with statements like “we construct knowledge in conversation with other people”, objects never “cooperate in the effort to be known”, and “error is not…something that fails to reflect reality [but rather] what serves ‘only private purposes of one’s own’”
Now, as a new instructor, I’ve gotten a lot of practical examples from Bruffee of how to organize students into groups to encourage analysis of texts and discussion. Yet I wonder how much his epistemology is tightly connected to the practice of collaborative learning.
I most certainly am not a Cartesian (the image Bruffee presents is of knowledge being solemnly handed from the authoritative professor to the waiting, passive student). But that does not mean that knowledge is merely community consensus. Couldn’t this model be taken to include the creationist community and the evolutionary community as merely competing discourses, with solely internal errors? After all, the world doesn’t “cooperate” in our efforts to understand it. You know, like by having fossils in certain geographical strata or by being subject to falsifiable predictions.
Okay, I’ll peel back the sarcasm a bit. My frustration is that Bruffee relies for his epistemology solely upon Richard Rorty and Thomas Kuhn, with a bit of John Dewey tossed in here and there. I take that back: he cites Wittgenstein dutifully and uncritically at two points: “[He] for whom what we call ‘knowledge’ is one or another ‘language game.’” The problem with this particular sentence is that Wittgenstein wasn’t necessarily arguing for multiple and incommensurable language games of the sort Bruffee seems to have in mind.
Beyond the nitty-gritty of interpretation, the larger problem I have with Bruffee is that he forces a false dichotomy. Either we must choose a foundationalist account knowledge in which we have objective access to bits of knowledge or else knowledge is constructed in conversation with other humans and is not impacted by the world. Error has no reference to reality, but only to the linguistic conventions of a particular academic community.
As a philosophy student, I recognize that there is a sense in which one needs to learn a new language to participate in academic spheres. When I started studying philosophy, I was confounded by the thought experiments my peers tossed around: “What if on Twin Earth, we have inverted color vision…?” Coming from two years of seminary, I was concerned with accurate reading of the texts we read for class. It took a class or two until I got the hang of the lingo, the scope of analytic philosophy, its aims, etc.
However, as much as I admit that my aims in teaching “critical thinking” is part of “acculturating” my students to a new kind of language, I adamantly reject the idea that I’m moving only in the realm of social construction. The world impinges upon us, even if we must couch that impingement in conceptual terms. Richard Rorty has been criticized for this by many; I don’t need to rehash that here (just do a Google search or look on Amazon.com or JSTOR for books and articles by John McDowell, Donald Davidson, etc.).
I don’t know how much successful teaching has to be accompanied by highly self-reflective pedagogy. It’s part of my personality to analyze most everything I do, so naturally teaching comes under that umbrella. As teaching is concerned, at minimum, with gaining knowledge, one’s epistemology conceivably should shape one’s classroom. Yet there’s nothing to say that I cannot test various methods, without accepting the entire scaffolding beneath them. Maybe as I get more experience I can develop my own scaffolding.
January 30th, 2008 at 1:20 pm
It seems to me that to be a logically consistent researcher, some analytical choices have to made.
You either sit on this side of the fence or on that side of the fence. Yes, that is a dichotomy, but to not make an analytical choice risks calling the consistency of the logic behind your claims into question.
You write that you are not a Cartesian, but I sense that you don’t want to give up totally on that ontological dualism.
I would urge you to make a choice, settle into it and then push the logic of that choice and see where it takes you.
January 30th, 2008 at 5:47 pm
ck,
I think your intuition that there’s more logical space in epistemology than full-blown Cartesian foundationalism and Rorty-styled pragmatism is correct. Goldman’s reliabilism, for example, seems to fall nicely in the middle, as does James’ pragmatism.
I also think, though, that this sort of problem really sits on the dividing line between epistemology and ontology. For example, if the world itself is created through conversation with others, then the non-constructivist model of epistemology is badly mistaken. But we’d need an argument to accept that metaphysical claim.
January 30th, 2008 at 5:56 pm
@Jacob - I think that ADHR’s point (and mine) is that, epistemologically speaking, there are not just two choices. And further, in terms of pedagogy, I don’t think there is anything wrong with robust pluralism of method until I figure out my underlying philosophy. That approach in itself may yield a framework–as you imply when you say “see where it takes you.”
@ADHR - Yes, I wasn’t sure whether Bruffee was trying to make a metaphysical claim as well as epistemological. I need to go back and read his chapter on constructivist approaches to science and engineering because I think it would be very obvious there (I skipped it due to my interests).
January 30th, 2008 at 7:12 pm
Epistemologically, I agree. There are multiple possible epistemologies. Of course not all them can legitimately claim the mantel of “scientific.”
The point I’m trying to make isn’t limited to epistemology. ADHR suggests the problem rests on the line between ontology and epistemology. I tend to think that ultimately the concern is an ontological one. Where do you place your bet? Or on which presuppositions do you rest?
For myself, I take a relational posture similar to Rorty. Although, I readily admit that a relational ontology is a presupposition and therefore a matter of faith–a point Rorty was unwilling to admit or perhaps only begrudgingly willing to admit. Anyway, a relational ontology enables me to me to do systematic and empirically rich social scientific examinations. And, even more importantly, sustain a trusting bond with God.
January 30th, 2008 at 11:37 pm
The manner by which learning occurs, ultimately, is I think the underlying concern.
I think it is a much more organic personal business, far beyond anything we might have even considered. We cannot read minds and we cannot speak for the complex motives and thought processes of every individual. The uniting theories we propose are excellent in that they foster discussion but unless we all existed on some plane of groupthink, no one knows for sure.
January 31st, 2008 at 2:07 pm
@Jacob, ck: FWIW, I’m pretty confident of the claim that ontology is somehow constructed. Although I’d take my line from Kant rather than Rorty. Largely because there’s an explanationist argument to consider, which AFAIK, Rorty does not, namely: what accounts for why we construct the reality that we do? According to Kant, it’s the unknowable noumena. According to Rorty, it’s… what… chance?
@Comrade Kevin: We certainly can read minds. One way in which we explain behaviour is by attributing a wide variety of mental states to agents. Insofar as the attributions are correct, we’ll be able to accurately predict future behaviour. To me, that’s mind-reading.
January 31st, 2008 at 3:45 pm
To add to this discussion (which I’m really enjoying), one thing about teaching is that while we can “read minds” to some extent, part of the question is what kind of behavior we’re even aiming for.
That has to do with what you think knowledge is, what the goals of education are, how you think people learn, etc. (Oh, and what your institution expects…which I have nicely laid out on my syllabus).
In my ethics class, I’m having to consider how much “jargon” I want them to memorize and how much I want to focus on them regurgitating summaries of various theories. And how much do I want them to struggle with the texts on their own?
Yesterday I gave them a series of four stories about agency and action for them to discuss in groups and then compare to Aristotle’s views in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. I’m not planning to “give them the answer”, but to provide a sort of survey of what various interpretations have been.
Although that’s collaborative learning approach, I don’t think it means that we “construct” knowledge in community–it could also mean that we “uncover” knowledge together, and “construct” frameworks to interpret it…