Discourse Ethics: Habermas
Jürgen Habermas is an intimidating philosopher to read. The introductory paragraph in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives an idea as to why: "his extensive written work addresses topics stretching from social-political theory to aesthetics, epistemology and language to philosophy of religion, and his ideas have significantly influenced not only philosophy but also political-legal thought, sociology, communication studies, argumentation theory and rhetoric, developmental psychology and theology." Phew.
Too, he interacts with people on both sides of the "analytic-continental divide", including Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, Robert Brandon, and so on. This means I can’t plead out of reading him because he isn’t relevant (see list above) or in my area (he knows Kripke, Frege, et al as well as any analytic philosopher).
So what does he write about that’s significant for my interests? (Which, because you’re reading this, I assume are partly yours, too.)
In Discourse Ethics, he is, in part, outlining the formal possibilities of language and action aimed at reaching mutual understanding. Discourse is a special kind of speech act involved with solving differences over norms. Rather than merely analyzing what structures are culturally relevant (Robert’s Rules or Ilongot ‘crooked speech’), Habermas is trying to make universalizing claims for all humans.
What’s tricky about his argument is that he’s designed it to catch even the most die-hard skeptic. The idea is that to even object to his thesis, you have to admit first to its central ideas. If Habermas is successful, he’s achieved a sort of Holy Grail in philosophy.
To help me understand the project, below are the rules of discourse that govern the procedure of ethical decision-making. Later on, Habermas is going to talk about the limitations of discourse ethics. Even if it is the Holy Grail, it is not the Bible (keeping with the medieval metaphor). Discourse ethics requires some background, or lifeworld, and it is not going to answer specific questions of morality, merely give us the possibility that people of divergent cultures can undertake them.
Rules of discourse ethics
(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm not under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so.(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
(3.2)
a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2)
If you were a skeptic, you could object to this whole process by saying, no, I can convince someone that X using lies. This means that I’m rejecting (2.1) as a formal requirement for discourse. Habermas, however, would then respond by claiming that I’m using "convince" in the wrong way. If I respond by giving a reason for why my use of "convince" is valid, as is my entire concept, then I’m presupposing the process of argumentation Habermas outlines. I’m trying to convince Habermas by giving reasons.
The outline of rules above are approximations of what happens in socially situated contexts–Robert’s rules or (problematically, perhaps) crooked speech are ways to institutionalize discourse.
The fact that everyone entering into argument over a contested norm must, of necessity, presuppose these rules is called (U), or the universalization principle. The principle of discourse ethics (D) is the principle that valid norms can only be those that potentially meet approval of individuals engaging in practical discourse. Thus, (U) gives the formal possibility of argumentation and (D) gives us the criteria for making moral judgments. One is substantive, one is formal.
What Discourse Ethics Cannot Do
Habermas is clear, however, in recognizing that his method (which he calls the transcendental-pragmatic justification) does not in itself become some sort of "ultimate justification" that acts as an indubitable foundation to moral philosophy. Interestingly, I think, he believes that moral intuitions are in some way prior to philosophy. He thinks that philosophy itself, rather, by means of value skepticism and legal positivism, has confused people through education. Wittgenstein is right (at least here), for Habermas, that philosophy has a therapeutic role.
Secondly, morality is "always embedded in what Hegel called ethical life (Sittlichkeit)" and is focused upon formal possibility, it does have limits. Habermas doesn’t think these limits are damning, however. The skeptic can continue in questioning the methods of argumentation above, but because she has to continue to argue in order to do so, there is no way out. Only "suicide or a serious mental illness" is the skeptic’s recourse. All cultures have some form of "rule-governed interaction" which has been institutionalized in some way, which are aimed at reaching understanding between mutually recognized interlocutors. Even though the Ilongot might give us an empirical problem for (2.1) above, the existence of crooked speech supports the idea of institutionalizing this human effort of argumentation.
One problem Habermas must face is that of regress, like the one Achilles faced with the skeptical Tortoise in Lewis Carroll’s story. Discourse ethics cannot tell us when to use it, when it is appropriate to enter into this kind of argumentation over a contested norm. Some form of "prudence" that is prior to discourse ethics is required, which takes place in a specific socio-historical context, according to cultural conventions. As far as I can tell, the response Habermas makes is that yes, in the third-person perspective, this is true. However, if you look at the situation from the performative attitude, then the problem is solved. There are no initially-agreed upon rules save for the ones that have to be presupposed in taking up argumentation (the ones listed above). As a participant in the debate, my concern is not for ultimate justification about the principles of the debate itself.
Whether these answers are satisfying will have to wait until another time.