Lived body and gender
One of the articles I found when researching more analytic approaches to gender (in contrast to continental) is Lived Body vs Gender by Iris Marion Young, who was in the Political Science Department at University of Chicago. The article’s basic argument is in response to an assertion by Toril Moi–who believes gender should be replaced by the concept of “lived body experience.”
The trouble with gender is that it tends to essentialize concepts, says Moi, whereas by looking at existential, lived body experience, we can correct the feminist social constructivist theories which are growing increasingly distanced from biological reality.
Young thinks that Moi is on to something, but argues that gender does some analytic work, especially in relationship to political structures. While conceiving of people as gendered runs the risk of pressing the historical individual into a pre-made category, recognizing the way social structures are gendered can be helpful for critique. Moi mentions two, heteronormativity and the private/public spheres of work which correspond to female/male domains.
What I found interesting was the discussion of “lived body experience.” When I was at Covenant Seminary, I took an epistemology class with Esther Meek, who is a scholar of Michael Polanyi. In addition to Polanyi, I heard the name “Merleau-Ponty” quite frequently. (However, I’ve never had the opportunity to read him, so I can’t really speak to his theories.) As well, the term “lived body” came up repeatedly, in connection with knowing God. Here, however, it is in connection with knowing gender:
One’s lived body isn’t reducible to physical facts (biology, chemistry, etc), and the lived body is enculturated–it is situated in a historical position and understood through that culture’s environment. The idea of lived body is an attempt to maintain a biological underpinning–although it isn’t reducible to physical facts, those facts are constitutive. It is also an attempt to understand how we are both constrained (historical, cultural and biological facts precede us) and yet free (we understand and “recreate” ourselves in relationship to these facts, or facticity).
Okay, but is this tenable? The claim which is especially central is the idea that lived body isn’t reducible to physical facts. What kind of reduction is involved? Below are a few different ones:
Conceptual Reductive Analysis
Iff for each non-physical predicate F, there is a physical predicate G such that a sentence of the form ‘x is F iff x is G‘ is analytically true.
Intertheoretic Reduction
Iff for each non-physical predicate F, there is a physical predicate G such that a sentence of the form ‘x is F iif x is G‘ expresses a bridge law.
A Priori Reduction
Iff for each non-physical predicate F, there is a physical predicate G such that a sentence of the form ‘x is F iif x is G’ is a priori.
These are taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (and yes, if you’re wondering, I have access to other sources, but this is the handiest one right now). When I have time, I’ll talk more about reduction and gender.
Meanwhile, any of my more learned readers who have thoughts, leave ‘em in the comments!
Image: Picasso’s “Girl Before a Mirror”, 1932.