Thought experiments gone bad
Okay, so I said I’d leave Egnor alone. But this time, he’s delving into philosophical territory with a “thought experiment” purported to show that the brain is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause for the mind’s existence.
Read it here, then see if you can determine where he goes wrong. More after the jump.
Here are the main premises of his argument. Substitute “cell phone” for “brain” and “noises” for “mind” to get the parallel argument for mind/brain relations.
1) The cell phone is necessary for all of the noises
2) The cell phone is sufficient to produce noises that only have properties — like frequency and amplitude — that are shared with the circuitry in the cell phone itself
3) The cell phone is insufficient to fully account for the noises (i.e., the voices) that have meaning, because meaning is not a property of matter. The only thing that can cause meaning is a person.
Do you see how he is begging the question? He’s assuming that “meaning is not a property of matter.” If you start with this assumption, then the argument could follow. But the problem is that his thought experiment assumes a dualistic perspective while trying to prove it.
Second, he’s claiming that the clue for the Verizon-doubters (his term for people who doubt the voices are coming from somewhere outside the phone) should be that the noises have meaning. But a recording of human voices have meaning–and the explanation for those voices would lie within the machine itself. Or, to take it a step further, a program which generates sounds based on symbols (like Stephen Hawking’s computerized voice) can “cause meaning”, but there need not be a person present.
The thought experiment is suspect, too, because presumably if the civilization has advanced technology, they would be able to see that the cell phone has receivers. And wouldn’t the cell phone also need an explanation for non-meaningful sounds that are transmitted through it? Why just full sentences? Would gibberish count as a clue?
Egnor tried another approach, responding to PZ Myers in his last post with a challenge: show me where altruism is, if it is physical! He makes this claim:
If altruism is located in the brain, then some changes in location of the brain must, to use a mathematical term, ‘map’ to changes in altruism. That is, if you move your brain, you move your altruism in some discernable way. And ‘moving’ altruism means changing its properties.
First, no one said altruism is located in the brain. As Palmer asked of Searle (who, as I’ve shown, is not on the same page as Egnor), does it mean anything to say “liquidity is in water”? Even if the property of being liquid is reducible to the material properties of water (which I don’t think Egnor would dispute), the question, “where is liquidity” is still not one we generally recognize as making sense. A typical answer is, “it is instantiated in the water”–but the property itself can be instantiated in several locations at once, which makes it difficult to say where “the property” is.
(Check out the SEP on properties if you want some reading that will make your head spin.)
The property of liquidity is a way to describe causal relationships between molecules. The property of altruism (!) is a way to describe causal relationships between human beings.
Is that such a difficult idea to grasp? Yes, there are some heavy-duty questions to ask about causes, about explanations, etc. But Egnor’s attempts at “philosophizing” fall far short of the nuance and precision required ask them well. (Please note I am not putting myself forward as a replacement, merely as a critic.)
In examining arguments for holes, there are few things to always ask yourself:
1. Appeal to consequences. Does the speaker claim X is untrue because of negative consequences? ”Strictly materialistic neuroscience is nonsense, because it inherently denies the existence of free will and of intentionality…” (I.e., perhaps free will and intentionality are illusions.)
2. Begging the question. Does the speaker assume a crucial part of their conclusion in the premises? See my example above.
3. False Dilemma. Are there other options the speaker is leaving out? “Strictly materialistic neuroscience is nonsense, because it inherently denies the existence of free will and of intentionality…A real understanding of the mind must be open to immaterial causes.” (I.e., perhaps materialistic neuroscience does not deny the existence of free will–the choice is not between free will vs. no free will).
4. Straw Men. Is the speaker presenting her opponents’ views correctly? See example above with location of altruism.
5. Appeal to Belief. Is the speaker claiming something is true because many people believe it? “Gage’s associates and family realized that his behavioral changes were ‘not him’, and his behavior was ‘not him’ in a way that diminished his personal responsibility for his actions.” (I.e., Egnor assumes that because people believed Gage’s behavior was ‘not him’, that it was not, and is a problem for materialism.)
These are just five typical errors you’ll see in reasoning. Lastly, there is the appeal to authority, which is implicit in Egnor’s writing as a neurosurgeon on topics of mind. Simply having the medical skills to treat brain diseases does not mean that you are an expert in the larger questions about mind/brain relationships. The more he writes, the more he digs a hole.
See PZ Myers’ take on the analogy from a scientific perspective. As I’ve said, I’m primarily tackling his approach to the philosophical topics and his use of reasoning.