On “natural”
I’m excerpting this discussion of the term “nature” from Martha Nussbaum’s essay, “Constructing Love, Desire, and Care” (Sex and Social Justice) because I want to be able to link back to it. To make it clearer, I’ve added bullet-point formatting. In terms of the ethical questions often discussed here, it’s a great touchstone*:
We use the term “nature” in multiple and slippery ways.
- When we say that a certain way of doing things exists “by nature,” we sometimes mean that this is the way things are given in our innate equipment, without the transformative influence of human choice and effort.
- Sometimes we simply mean that this is a deeply habitual way for things to be, that anything else seems weird.
- Sometimes we mean that things cannot be otherwise.
- Sometimes, finally, we mean that it is fitting and proper that they should be this way (”Unnatural” here means “to be shunned.”)
All four meanings are logically independent:
- The fact that something is customary does not imply that it is given in our innate equipment, nor does an innate basis always imply customariness…
- Neither of these implies that the way of proceeding is necessary and immutable.
- And finally, none of the other three implies that the way of proceeding is right and proper. Innate tendencies can be defective or bad: We seek to correct myopia and other bodily defects; we teach children not to put their own concerns at the center of the universe.
- So too with customs: We criticize them if they do not seem to promote well-being or justice. The necessary character of bodily weakness and death is not usually thought to make them good things.
- And the fact that something is fitting and proper does not by itself show that it is innate, customary or necessary.
(End of quotation: from page 255 of the 1999 Oxford UP edition.)
* There’s an article at Slate.com about “unnatural” food colors, which is worth viewing through this lens as well.